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Rarely do people stay glued to their televisions in order to watch 
events they do not enjoy. But such was unquestionably the case with 
the Senate hearings on Clarence Thomas' nomination to the Supreme 
Court. There was widespread agreement on only one thing: 
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Something had gone terribly wrong with the process. Right or left, 
feminist or not, pro-life or pro-choice, however one stood on the 
question of confirmation, the hearings defied simple analysis. Racism 
and sexism provided a troubling backdrop as the hearings reminded 
us how little we understand one another. Neither Thomas nor Hill 
were easily stereotyped. Thomas radiated real strength and 
confidence. But equally real was the feeling of vulnerability that 
accompanied the charge that his opponents had made him the victim 
of a high-tech lynching. And Thomas was not the only paradox. 
Anita Hill had a prim and fastidious appearance that made her solemn 
use of words like "penis" and "pubic hair" seem surreal and 
unaccountable. Thus, the hearings generated a confusing array of 
images; like a kaleidoscope, they reflected American political life 
from many strange and unfamiliar perspectives. 
The purpose of this Essay is to cut through some of the confusion 
and to consider Clarence Thomas on his own terms. What kind of 
person is he? Will he make a wise judge? Will the Supreme Court be 
enriched by his presence? These are important questions and 
answering them is not a simple matter. Inevitably, our understanding 
of Thomas is shaped by the political strategies of his supporters and 
opponents. Thus, in Part I, I consider these strategies and their effect 
upon public perceptions. As the hearings wore on, however, Thomas 
seemed to escape from Iris handlers and to present himself directly to 
the American people. In Part IT, I consider what we learned about 
Thomas in the course of the hearings and what conclusions we might 
draw about his abilities as a judge. In making this assessment, I argue 
that good judging requires not only a talent for abstract analysis but 
also an ability to connect with the human context. With respect to the 
latter, I suggest that Justice Thomas is a man with an extreme 
preference for the ideological over the personal, for the general over 
the specific, and for abstract principles over concrete applications. 
Finally, I offer some conclusions-speculative and tentative 
conclusions to be sure-about Clarence Thomas and his future on the 
Supreme Court. 
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I. POINT AND COUNTERPOINT: THE CONFLICTING 
IMAGES OF CLARENCE THOMAS 
119 
An appointee's ultimate performance on the Court is notoriously 
difficult to predict. Many doubtful candidates have risen to the occa-
sion while others have displayed unexpected compassion for the dis-
advantaged and disempowered. Thus, it is not surprising that there is 
little consensus among lawyers and scholars as to what should count as 
qualifications for a Supreme Court appointment. Certainly, some 
requirements are beyond practical controversy. It is desirable, for 
example, that nominees have legal training and that they have no 
criminal record. In addition, a number of recent nominees have failed 
confirmation for a variety of reasons; among them are unethical con-
duct,! discriminatory attitudes,2 and public use of marijuana.3 And 
beyond these considerations, most of us hope that those who are 
appointed will possess something beyond minimum standards of intel-
ligence, honesty, and decency. But, in practice, assessing these qualifi-
cations is often a matter of considerable controversy. 
In analyzing the judicial task, legal theorists have generally 
divided into two camps. On the one hand, there are formalists who 
argue that legal decisionmaking is a matter of applying preexisting 
rules or theories to the facts of a given case.4 On the other hand, 
there are realists who reject this idea and argue that substantive legal 
theories do not decide concrete cases.s Not surprisingly, these two 
1. Justice Fortas, for example, withdrew under pressure after senators began questioning 
the propriety of certain business arrangements. 
2. During the Nixon administration, Judges Carswell and Haynsworth failed confirmation 
because it appeared that they had discriminatory attitudes towards African Americans. More 
recently, Judge Bork failed confirmation, in part, because of his insensitivity to women's claims 
for equality. 
3. In 1988 Professor Ginsberg withdrew from the confirmation process after it was dis-
closed that he frequently smoked marijuana at law school parties. The "drug free" requirement, 
however, is somewhat flexible. Judge Thomas was confirmed despite his admission that he had 
experimented with marijuana in his youth. Thus, it appears that early and infrequent drug use, 
especially if coupled with repentance, is not disqualifying. 
4. While few contemporary theorists adhere to the strict LangdeUian view that formal 
legal rules will provide an unequivocal answer to every legal question, there are many who 
believe that legal decisionmaking is properly a matter of applying some sort of preexisting rule 
or theory to the facts of a specific controversy. Dworkin, for example, believes that judicial 
decisions should be governed by both legal and moral principles. Thus, Dworkin argues that 
judges should decide constitutional cases by interpreting the relevant constitutional provision in 
the context of the "best" theory of moral or natural law. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHI'S SERIOUSLY (1977). 
5. For example, some realists believed that judges decide cases intuitively and that they 
invoke legal rules ouly to rationalize decisions that have been previously made. See, e.g., Joseph 
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camps possess different attitudes towards judicial selection. The for-
malist places the emphasis on substantive law and normative theory, 
beginning the process with assumptions about the correctness of cer-
tain legal views and proceeding to make an evaluation by examining 
the candidate's grasp of and commitment to these views. The realist, 
by contrast, focuses on character and background, asking whether the 
prospective judge has the kind of character and background that 
would produce sound intuitions for resolving legal controversies. 
Since the New Deal, formalism has been identified with the con-
servative camp, while realism has been closely allied with liberal 
causes. One of the ironies of the Thomas controversy was a reversal 
of these traditional alignments.6 The conservative forces seemed to 
adopt a realist strategy as President Bush pressed the argument that 
Thomas' personal history of economic and racial disadvantage were 
strong qualifications for the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the liberal 
anti-Thomas forces seemed to take a formalist stance as they 
attempted to refocus the debate away from Thomas' personal history 
and toward the substance of his views on law and legal theory? 
A. POINT: THOMAS' LIFE STORY As A THEME 
FOR HIs SUPPORTERS 
On July 1, 1991, President George Bush nominated Clarence 
Thomas to the Supreme Court of the United States describing him as 
"the best qualified" person for the job.s Certainly Bush was exagger-
ating. Thomas' record at Yale Law School was not particularly distin-
guished. Nor did he distinguish himself in his few years of legal 
C. Hutchison, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the Hunch in Judicial Decision, 14 
CoRNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). 
6. Dean Calabresi was a notable exception. A liberal from Yale with a long realist pedi-
gree, he suggested that the Senate should look for strong character in a Supreme Court nominee. 
Speaking of the great Justices of the past, he argued: "In the end, it was a combination of charac-
ter, ability, a willingness to work really hard and openness to new views that made them great 
justices. These qualities, if there truly is openness, matter far more than past positions." The 
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 250 
(1991) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
7. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Clarence Thomas, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 7, 
1991, at 41. If, as Dworkin argues, being qualified is a matter of holding the "best" theories of 
law and morals, then it follows that the job of the Senate is to assess the merits of a nominee's 
beliefs. Thus, in Dworkin's view, Thomas' opponents were fully justified in trying to pin him 
down with respect to his views on natural law. 
8. Press Conference with President Bush and Supreme Court Justice Nominee Clarence 
Thomas, FED. NEWS SERVICE, July 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FEDNEW File 
[hereinafter Press Conference]. 
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practice.9 In the Reagan-Bush years, Thomas held a series of political 
jobs culminating in a recent appointment to the United States Court 
of Appeals. Thus, while Thomas had been visible as one of the few 
Black participants in the Reagan and Bush administrations, there was 
little in his professional history that suggested that he was exception-
ally well qualified to sit on the Supreme Court. In fact, Thomas was 
the first Supreme Court appointment to receive a "qualified" rather 
than a "highly qualified" designation from the American Bar 
Association.10 
One explanation for Bush's overly generous appraisal of Thomas' 
credentials is that Bush viewed Thomas as an affirmative action candi-
date. Clarence Thomas may not have been the "best" qualified per-
son for the job, but he did seem to have the kind of minimalist 
qualifications that cynical proponents of affirmative action purport to 
find acceptable. Thus, many felt that Bush's strong endorsement of 
Thomas was accompanied by an invisible wink: Clarence Thomas is 
the best-qualified ... (insert the word "Black") ... man for the job. 
And, so strong is the hypocrisy that has grown up around affirmative 
action, that many believed this even in the face of Bush's explicit 
denial: "[T]he fact that he is Black and a minority has nothing to do 
with this."l1 
There are two reasons, however, why it makes sense to believe 
that Thomas was not an affirmative action appointment and that Bush 
was not trying to maintain diversity on the Court by appointing the 
"best-qualified Black."12 First, the claim that Thomas is the best-qual-
ified Black is so clearly false that it could not be credited except in the 
presence of some exceedingly negative stereotypes about Black peo-
ple and their achievements. Second, Bush has consistently demon-
strated in real and concrete terms that he is not the sort of man who 
places a positive value on diversifying American political life. His 
9. He chiefly argued routine tax cases for the state of Missouri. 
10. And even this modest recommendation was not unanimous with two members of the 
panel ranking him as "not qualified." Anthony Lewis, Thomas Ends Testimony but Senators 
Grumble Over Elusive Views, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at A14. 
11. For many Americans, affirmative action has become the ultimate game of denial in 
which poorly qualified candidates are described as excellent prospects. For an extended discus-
sion of the ambiguities of affirmative action, see Margaret Jane Radin, Affirmative Action Rheto-
ric, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 130 (1991). 
12. Many people use the term "affirmative action" loosely to cover any decision that is 
made in part on the basis of race. More precisely, however, affirmative action takes place when 
special consideration is given to race in order to promote racial justice; it does not include situa-
tions where race is considered for political or pragmatic reasons. 
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repeated opposition to civil rights legislation and the employment 
practices of his own administration are strong evidence that George 
Bush is sincerely and firmly opposed to affirmative action in all its 
forms.13 
While race was certainly a factor in Bush's selection of Thomas, it 
mattered in a way that had little to do with affirmative action. It was 
in Bush's best interest to find a nominee who would be acceptable to 
the political right but would be confirmed with the least amount of 
controversy. Thomas was certainly conservative. He was also Black 
and likely to receive support from significant segments of the Black 
community.14 Furthermore, his appointment would create a real 
dilemma for liberal white senators-those senators who would be 
most opposed to his politics were precisely those who would be most 
silenced by his racial identity. Thus, while Thomas was controversial, 
it must have seemed in the pre-Anita Hill days of summer that he 
stood a good chance of getting through the confirmation process with-
out major incident. 
An essential elemep.t of the administration's plan to avoid contro-
versy was the espousal of a realist theory of judicial selection. The 
administration consistently tried to focus the debate on Thomas' per-
sonal history and away from his legal views and theories. Bush's 
praise for Thomas must be understood in these terms. In making the 
appointment, Bush emphasized the fact that Thomas grew up in the 
midst of poverty in the racially segregated South. Despite this back-
ground, Bush continued, Thomas had ~'excelled in everything that he 
has attempted. "15 Bush also referred to Thomas' personal characteris-
tics: "He is a delightful and warm, intelligent person who has great 
empathy and a wonderful sense of humor."16 He concluded by saying: 
"Judge Thomas' life is a model for all Americans, and he has earned 
13. For example, Bush's initial Cabinet contained ten white men, one white woman, and 
three men of color. In addition, Bush's steadfast opposition to quotas and his wavering support 
for civil rights legislation strongly suggests that he does not support most forms of affirmative 
action. 
14. Note that Thomas' race counted for Bush not because of affirmative action but because 
of certain political advantages; 
15. Press Conference, supra note 8. 
16. Id. Both President Bush and Senator Danforth, Thomas' sponsor in the Senate, 
seemed fixated upon his laugh. For an analysis of this, see Toni Morrison, Introduction: Friday 
on the Potomac, in RACE-ING JuSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: EsSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLAR-
ENCE THOMAS, AND THE CoNSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY at vii (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter RACE-ING JUSTICE]. 
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the right to sit on this nation's highest COurt."17 In making these com-
ments, Bush was attempting to craft an image of Clarence Thomas 
that presented just the right combination of conservative ideology, 
personal charm, acceptable (if not outstanding) legal credentials, and 
a background that suggested character, empathy, and compassion. In 
addition, Bush hoped to undermine liberal opposition with the 
unstated but powerful argument that a man like Thomas, who had 
personally experienced racism and discrimination, could surely be 
trusted to safeguard the civil rights of others. 
B. COUNTERPOINT: THOMAS' THEORIES OF NATURAL LAW As A 
Focus FOR THE QpposmoN 
Thomas' supporters portrayed him as a man whose strict con-
servative philosophy would be tempered by compassion. Their strat-
egy, however, was complicated by the fact that it rested upon a vision 
of Thomas that was not entirely consistent with his previous public 
record. Leaders of the Black community, in particular, were disturbed 
by his record on civil rights and by the level of concern he had shown 
for the poor and disadvantaged.18 These leaders charged that 
Thomas' conservative views had made him a willing tool of the white 
establishment,19 and they were soon joined in these charges by the 
white men who opposed him in the Senate. 
Thomas and his supporters had a ready response to this line of 
attack. The attack, they said, was racist. Everyone understands, they 
argued, that whites can be conservative for principled reasons but, 
they continued, when a Black such as Thomas embraces the same con-
servative principles, he is inevitably and unfairly accused of being an 
ambitious Uncle Tom. 
This charge of racism is overstated. While it is certainly true that 
Black conservatives are widely misunderstood, it is also true that 
Black leaders and white liberal senators would have opposed any 
white nominee who held the sort of extreme conservative views that 
Thomas held. Nevertheless, this aspect of racial politics played an 
17. Press Conference, supra note 8. 
18. His conduct as a public official as well as his express convictions seem to suggest that he 
will not support government help for the disempowered and disadvantaged. 
19. See, e.g., Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, In Opposition to Clarence Thomas: 
Where We Must Stand and Why, reprinted in CoURT OF APPEAL: THE BLACK CoMMUNITY 
SPEAKS OUT ON THE RACIAL AND SEXUAL POUTICS OF THOMAS V. Hn.L 231 (Robert Chrisman 
& Robert L. Allen eds., 1992) [hereinafter CoURT OF APPEAL]; The NAACP Announces Oppo-
sition to Judge Thomas's Nomination, reprinted in CoURT OF APPEAL, supra, at 269. 
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important role in shaping the contours of the Senate hearings. The 
fear of appearing racist led Thomas' white, liberal critics to frame 
their questions and contentions entirely in tenns of substantive con· 
troversy. If Thomas' supporters wanted to discuss his personality and 
character, his opponents were equally determined to shift the discus· 
sion to the merits of his political and legal opinions. 
As the liberals on the Judiciary Committee tried to focus discus· 
sion on Thomas' substantive views, they encountered a serious obsta· 
cle. Thomas repeatedly insisted that he had no firm views upon any 
controversial question that might come before the Court. The White 
House strategy was clear: By urging Thomas to avoid controversy, the 
administration hoped that he would receive the same kind of amiable 
treatment that had been given to Justice Souter.20 Unlike Souter, 
however, Thomas did not start with a blank slate. Thomas had been 
one of the most outspoken members of the Reagan and Bush adminis· 
trations. In speeches, interviews, and published articles, he had 
aggressively stated his conservative views on many contemporary con· 
troversies. And, in speaking out, Thomas had not adopted a judicial 
tone. He had sounded less like a judge and more like someone who 
was anxious to prove that a Black man could embrace political posi· 
tions·that were as extreme and uncompromising as those of the most 
conservative whites.21 How then could he convincingly claim to pos· 
sess an open mind and a judicial temperament? Would not these 
claims raise significant doubts about his credibility? What could he 
say that would effectively counter his record and reputation as an 
energetic controversialist? 
Thomas' strategy in this regard had several elements. First, there 
was simple denial. For example, Thomas generally denied having 
views about the correctness of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.22 
Specifically, he stated that during his years at Yale, he had never dis· 
cussed or thought about the issue. And, while he did not exactly say 
so, he did in fact imply that it would take some further reflection on 
his part before he could be sure what his final conclusions would be 
with respect to the abortion controversy.23 
20. Since Justice Souter had sidestepped all substantive controversy, there had been little 
to fuel Senate opposition to his appointment. 
21. This was, in fact, Thomas' perception of his own situation. See Clarence Thomas, No 
Room at the Inn: The Loneliness of the Black Conservative, POL'y REv., Fall 1991, at 72, 76. 
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
23. All of this seems extremely disingenuous. Certainly Thomas knew at the time of the 
hearings that he would vote to overturn Roe v. Wade as soon as the issue came before the Court. 
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The second element of Thomas' strategy was disavowal. Thomas 
repeatedly tried to distance himself from previous statements by sug-
gesting that his warm endorsements of extreme conservative views 
were not what they seemed. He had, for example, only seemed to 
endorse the idea that the Supreme Court should make use of language 
in the Declaration of Independence to criminalize all abortions as a 
constitutional matter.24 Similarly, he had only seemed to argue that 
the Court should expand the protection for property rights in such a 
way that private owners would be spared the burden of environmental 
regulation.25 He had endorsed these views, he testified, simply to be 
polite to conservative audiences. Indeed, his interest in these matters 
was so marginal that he had not even read the arguments in ques-
tion.26 Thus, much to the frustration of Senate staffers who had 
worked hard to document his political and legal views, Thomas 
repeatedly dismissed his own written and recorded statements as 
unreliable indications of his true opinions. 
In disavowing his earlier statements, Thomas portrayed himself 
as a busy government official who did not have time to read all the 
work that etiquette required him to praise. Other parts of his testi-
mony painted a somewhat different picture. Thomas often character-
ized himself as an avid intellectual who embraced many different 
ideas only in the course of an ongoing philosophical inquiry. Thus, for 
example, his endorsement of Sowell's argument that women earn less 
money because they do not like well-paying work27 did not, according 
to Thomas, express his true views. He believed, he said, that women 
are victims of discrimination in fact but, the facts notwithstanding, he 
24. If he had seemed, at one point, to endorse Lewis Lehrman's argument that anti-abor-
tion regulation was affirmatively mandated by the Declaration of Independence, Lewis E. Lehr-
man, The Declaration of Independence and the Right to Life, AM. SPECTATOR, April 1987, at 21; 
Thomas, supra note 21, at 78, that was simply a move in his overall strategy to interest the 
Republican Party in a civil rights agenda: 
"1 was speaking in the Lewis Lehrman auditorium of the Heritage Foundation. 1 
thought that, if 1 demonstrated that one of their own accepted at least the concept of 
natural rights, that they would be more apt to accept that concept as an underlying 
principle for being more aggressive on civil rights." 
TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES 180 (1992) (quoting Thomas). 
25. PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 24, at 176. 
26. lei. In a similar fashion, Thomas disavowed the views contained in a report issued by 
the White House Working Group on the Family. Thomas was a member of the Group and had 
signed on to the report as one of its authors. Nevertheless, when pressed on one of its more 
controversial recommendations, Thomas claimed that he had written only one small section of 
the report and that he had not even read the remainder. lei. at 180. 
27. Hearings, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 144-48. 
126 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:117 
found Sowell's "statistical" point interesting and intriguing.28 Simi-
larly, Thomas dismissed his own repeated suggestion that natural law 
should be used to decide constitutional cases as nothing more than an 
expression of his abstract interest in political theory-natural law, he 
claimed, had nothing at all to do with how he would decide actual 
cases. Thus, Thomas tried to separate his intellectual persona-a man 
who thought about statistics and political theory as part of a detached 
intellectual discourse-from the Supreme Court Justice he was anx-
ious to become. The potential Justice, he seemed to suggest, was a 
practical man who (most likely, though he could not say definitely) 
held more mainstream views. 
The final element of Thomas' strategy was to claim, as Souter had 
claimed, that it would be inappropriate for him to discuss his current 
thinking about any issue that might arise before the Court. For exam-
ple, even though his background and his political alliances suggested 
that he was avidly opposed to abortion, Thomas demurely insisted 
that he be treated as though his opinions were tentative and uncer-
tain.29 As a judge, he argued, he had to develop an open mind with 
respect to the particular cases and, accordingly, he had "stripped 
down like a runner" in order to meet the demands of judicial office.30 
And, since he had bowed to the dictates of fairness, so must the Sen-
ate. Respect for the integrity of the judicial function, his supporters 
argued, required the Senate to allow Thomas to maintain a dignified 
silence on all controversial matters. 
The overall effect of Thomas' strategy was complicated. For 
some who followed the hearings and were knowledgeable about his 
career, Thomas' disavowals seemed disingenuous, unprincipled, and 
cynicaPl For others, Thomas' performance simply reflected the polit-
ical reality of the confirmation process. In the battle of soundbites, 
Thomas had not been "tagged" with any of the controversial views 
that he had previously endorsed. And, since he could not be tagged, it 
was difficult for opponents to find a focus. Their only hope, it seemed, 
was to persuade the public to think about Thomas' denials and dis-
avowals in the context of his ongoing commitment to conservative 
28. Id. 
29. Hearings, supra note 27, at 27, 60-61. 
30. Id. at 61. 
31. Thomas is quoted as telling William Gates: "'My motto is "Don't get mad. Don't get 
even, get confirmed."'" PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 24, at 178. 
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legal theory.32 But, not surprisingly, this hope proved elusive. The 
American public, confronted by a humble, genial, and generally likea-
ble Black man, was little inclined to take up legal theory as a way of 
predicting his influence on an already solidly conservative Supreme 
Court. 
II. WHO IS CLARENCE THOMAS AND WHAT KIND OF 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WILL HE BE? 
In the last part, I argued that public perceptions of Thomas were 
shaped by two competing strategies. One was the Horatio Alger 
image cultivated by his supporters. The other was his opponents' 
charge of opportunism-the charge that Thomas was hiding his views 
behind a series of confirmation conversions and false claims of judicial 
neutrality. While there is some truth to both images, neither tells us 
much about Thomas' character. The Horatio Alger image overlooks 
the fact that those who escape from humble origins are not necessarily 
hard-working and honest. Similarly, the charge of opportunism denies 
the political realities of the confrrmation process.33 
In this part, I will look beyond the political-image making and 
attempt to address a central question that has been the subject of sur-
prisingly little attention: Who is Clarence Thomas and what sort of 
Supreme Court Justice will he ultimately prove to be? I will tackle 
this issue in two stages. FIrst, I will examine the nature of judicial 
decisionmaking with a view towards defining the characteristics and 
attitudes that lead to doing it well. Second, I will consider what we 
learned about Thomas from the confirmation process. Specifically, I 
will address the following issues: How does Thomas think about the 
world? What kind of evidence does he find persuasive? What type of 
factors are important to him in making a decision? In posing these 
questions, I will be seeking to define what I take to be a fundamental 
constituent of Thomas' intellectual life. Thomas, I will argue, is a man 
who thinks and makes decisions at a high level of abstraction. He is a 
man of ideas who is not easily moved by individual stories and per-
sonal experience. 
Before beginning, I would like to note that my discussion will 
take Thomas entirely on his own terms. Thus, even though Thomas' 
32. The soundbite that expressed this approach was the oft·repeated accusation that 
Thomas had undergone a confirmation conversion. 
33. After Bork's failed confirmation, nominees have been well advised to consider how 
their answers will play on the evening news. 
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credibility was subject to question, 1 will proceed on the basis that his 
testimony was generally truthful with respect to his own recollections 
of motives and events. 1 will also try to focus on Thomas as a raceless 
and genderless individual even while recognizing that this approach 
has serious limitations. One difficulty is that it ignores issues that are 
frequently and wrongfully marginalized. Another is the obvious fact 
that Thomas' race and gender are strong constituents of who he is and 
who others conceive him to be. Thomas' life experiences-that means 
his experiences as a Black and male person-have clearly had a signif-
icant impact on both his intellectual style and on his understanding of 
legal and political issues. But, despite these problems, my thoughts 
about the hearings were drawn over and over again to this simple 
observation: If we-we white peoplf?4-only talk about Thomas in 
relation to his race and gender, if we fail to examine his own, particu-
lar qualifications for high judicial office, then our failure to move 
beyond race-based considerations deprives Thomas of the kind of 
individual recognition and consideration to which he is entitled. 
A. JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
It is generally thought that there are good judges and bad judges 
and that judicial decisionmaking is the type of activity that can be 
done well or poorly. Good judges are deliberative and thoughtful. 
Bad judges are dogmatic and impulsive. Sometimes, when we call 
someone a good judge, we mean that we agree with the outcome of 
the cases that (s)he has decided. On other occasions, we mean some-
thing different. We say, for example: "I don't always agree with Judge 
Smith's decisions but 1 have to admit that Smith is a very good judge." 
What is it that we mean when we make such statements? What is it 
that judges do, and under what circumstances are we justified in mak-
ing the claim that they have done it well? 
One way to think about these questions is to focus on the process 
that judges utilize in making their decisions. We do not think of a 
judge who flips a coin as a good judge. To the contrary, we think of a 
good judge as one who deliberates in an open and conscientious 
34. Thomas seemed to recognize only occasionally that the path to his success had been 
cleared by others. Thus, the issue of his individualism was central to many African Americans 
who opposed him. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas 
from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv.100S (1992), reprinted in RACE-INO Jus. 
TICE, supra note 16, at 3; sources cited supra note 19. On the other hand, I feel that there is 
merit to Thomas' claim that white people should consider him as an individual and not just as a 
representative of his race. 
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way.35 At the trial level, we recognize good judges by their attentive-
ness to the witnesses, by the fairness with which they regulate their 
courtrooms, and by the deliberate and calm manner in which they 
reach a conclusion. At the appellate level, however, the process is 
more mysterious. There are no longer any witnesses-only sheafs of 
voiceless papers. The impersonality of the appellate process leads 
some to suggest that we can recognize good appellate judges by their 
grasp of abstract theory, by their commitment to sound arguments, 
and by their rejection of spurious claims. But this kind of theory-
based evaluation is vulnerable to the charge that the relevant theo-
ries-theories of law, theories of judicial role, and theories of the pub-
lic good-are all inherently political. If theories are the only things 
that count, then a judge who applies conservative theories will appear 
"brilliant" to conservative audiences while appearing "dogmatic or 
"political" to those with more liberal views. Thus, evaluating judges 
on the basis of the theories they hold is subject to the same kind of 
criticism as evaluating judges entirely on the basis of the outcomes 
they reach: Such judgments will inevitably seem "correct" to some but 
"political" to others. 
Furthermore, the identification of good judging with good theo-
ries 'relies upon a naive view about the nature of abstract normative 
judgments. Such judgments, it seems to argue, are simply the result of 
applying a general normative theory to the facts and circumstances of 
a concrete case. I have suggested elsewhere that this view of judicial 
decisionmaking is overly simplistic in that it overemphasizes the 
importance of theoretical considerations in the decisionmaking pro-
cess.36 I have also argued that a better analysis of judicial decision-
making begins with a recognition that making good decisions requires 
the simultaneous application of two distinct skills. 
The first skill has a theoretical element. It is the ability to locate 
the controversy \vithin a web (or several different webs) of relevant 
normative analysis. Suppose that a judge must decide a question 
under the Due Process Clause. In analyzing the question, (s)he must 
bring to bear a wide range of theoretical considerations. What is the 
relevant constitutional doctrine? Does the governmental action in 
35. But see Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990). 
36. Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1728 (1990); Catharine 
Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections on the Art of Judging, 49 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 323 (1992). This was, of course, also the point made by the moderate 
realists. 
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this case violate contemporary norms of fairness? Under what cir-
cumstances should a court interfere with the exercise of executive or 
legislative power? And so forth. A good judge is a theory sophisti-
cate because theory-be it legal doctrine, moral or political theory-
constructs every legal problem. A judge who is ignorant of these con-
siderations will misunderstand the nature of the case at hand. Thus, a 
good judge thinks about a case "from the top down" by starting with 
various theories that can be articulated independently of the problem 
and then proceeding to consider the problem in the context of these 
theories. 
Theories, however, are only part of the story. A good judge will 
also consider the problem "from the bottom Up."31 Abstract argu-
ments that are disconnected from real life are legalistic in the bad 
sense. They do not adequately attend to the fact that every case rep-
resents a series of real-world events that are experienced and inter-
preted by real-world participants. Sound legal analysis does not just 
parse the legal sentence; rather it begins with an understanding of the 
case that does justice to the differing perspective of each participant. 
Thus, a judge does not understand the facts of a case merely because 
(s)he can recite them as they appear in the briefs of the various par-
ties. Instead, what is required is a full understanding of the factual 
circumstances that have brought this case to judgment. Understand-
ing these circumstances requires real empathy and a sense of connec-
tion to the human aspects of the case. Who are these people? What is 
this case about from their point of view? And how will they be 
affected, as a practical matter, by the final judgment in this case? 
The above discussion suggests that judicial nominees should be 
evaluated in terms of two distinct qualities. On the one hand, we are 
looking for someone who is able to identify and apply the relevant 
legal theories. And, on the other hand, we are looking for someone 
who is able to connect with the human situation in a deep and sub-
stantial way. Indeed, those who are commonly recognized as the 
greatest American judges are precisely those who possess both these 
qualities. Furthermore, a little reflection on the special role of the 
Supreme Court will demonstrate that both of these qualities are par-
ticularly essential for Supreme Court Justices. The Supreme Court 
occupies a central position in American political life. Its caseload 
re"quires it to speak authoritatively on many of the most difficult issues 
37. The "bottom up" and "top down" terminology has recently been utilized by Cass R. 
Sunstein in On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1993). 
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of the day. It must also articulate and defend the nation's highest ide-
als. Fulfilling these responsibilities requires both technical legal abil-
ity and inspired human judgment. Technical abilities are important 
because the Court derives its exceptional authority from the wide-
spread understanding that a nontyrannical government must be con-
strained by law. The Court's moral authority therefore rests largely 
upon its legal powers; it can speak with authority precisely because it 
speaks in the name of impersonal legal constraint. On the other hand, 
a Supreme Court that spoke in nothing more than teclmical legal 
arguments would soon seem to be out of touch. Legal discourse has 
its limits and these limits create a need for inspired human judgment. 
Hard cases are not solved by theoretical agility; they inevitably 
require a fine sensibility for the realities of human life. Thus, 
Supreme Court nominees should possess more than just the right 
items on the resume-they should not ouly be good lawyers but they 
should also be wise leaders who are sensitive to a diverse range of 
interests, scrupulously fair to all parties, and knowledgeable about the 
circumstances of contemporary life. 
B. WHO Is CLARENCE THOMAS? 
In the last section, I argued that we should evaluate Thomas' 
qualifications by examining two distinct questions. The first question 
asks whether Thomas is theory literate, whether he is able to identify 
and apply relevant legal theories to the difficult controversies that 
come before the Court. The second asks whether he has the ability to 
connect with the human dimension of legal problems. In this section, 
I suggest that Thomas, in fact, has great difficulty with the second task. 
He is a man of ideas and abstractions and not the sort of person who 
readily recognizes the human realities that shape legal cases. Specifi-
cally, I shall discuss three incidents that I believe shed some light on 
Thomas' intellectual style. The first is Thomas' use of his sister as an 
illustration of the evils of welfare dependency. The second is Thomas' 
decision not to watch the testimony given by Anita Hill. And the 
third is a speech to the Heritage Foundation discussing the role of 
African Americans in conservative politics. I shall argue that each of 
these incidents indicates Thomas' preference for abstract ideas over 
the personal and concrete, and that together they suggest that Thomas 
lacks the kind of human understanding that is necessary to becoming a 
truly excellent Supreme Court Justice. 
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1. Emma Mae Martin: Thomas' Sister 
One recurrent topic of criticism against Thomas was the fact that 
he held his sister, Emma Mae Martin, up to public scorn by using her 
as an example of the dangers of welfare dependency.38 The point he 
was making was not original. The welfare system, he argued, 
encouraged the poor to become dependent on government programs. 
Martin, he claimed, was so dependent upon welfare that watching her 
wait for her check was like watching an addict waiting for a fix.39 
Indeed, she was a perfect example of what was wrong with the welfare 
system-it was so generous and so readily available that it caused 
recipients to lose all chance of self-reliance and self-esteem. Later, 
when reporters interviewed Martin, they found that she was not the 
welfare addict that Thomas had described. Her need for public assist-
ance arose largely because she was responsible for the care of an eld-
erly aunt. Furthermore, Thomas' public concern for her self-respect 
and self-reliance had been ill founded: Indeed, by the time she was 
interviewed, she was not on welfare at all. Instead, she was supporting 
herself and her family by working two shifts as a nursing home cook.4o 
This incident generated harsh criticism of Thomas. Some com-
mentators suggested that, even if his account had been accurate, his 
public use of his sister's, plight invaded her privacy and portrayed her 
in a most unsympathetic and ungenerous light.41 Some wondered why 
Thomas felt so little responsibility for the care of an elderly woman 
who was, after all, his aunt as well as his sister's.42 In addition, the 
incident led to questions about Thomas' failure to grasp the obvious-
is it possible that he simply failed to understand that, racism and sex-
ism being what they are, many hardworking Black women end up in 
the kind of poverty that mandates reliance on occasional government 
assistance?43 
38. PHELPs & WINTERNITZ, supra note 24, at 85. 
39. Thomas' addict analogy is really troubling. Does Thomas believe that all needs are 
addictions? If not, what converts Martin's obvious need for welfare into an addiction? Are her 
needs addictive merely because she cannot satisfy them with her own hard work and 
determination? 
40. PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 24, at 58. 
41. E.g., Jack E. White, The Pain of Being Black: The Other Side of Supreme Court Nomi-
nee Clarence Thomas's Inspiring Climb Out of Poverty Was the Price He Paid for Success, TIME, 
Sept. 16, 1991, at 24. 
42. E.g., id. 
43. Roundtable: Doubting Thomas, TIKKUN, SeptJOct. 1991 at 23, 27 (quoting Kimberle 
Crenshaw). 
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It is possible to make too much of what this story shows about 
Thomas' character.44 Perhaps we should follow the lead of Martin 
herse1f45 and decline to judge Thomas too harshly on the basis of this 
incident. And, once we step back from the moral judgment, we can 
see what this incident says about Thomas. It reveals Thomas as the 
kind of person whose intellectual life is dominated by abstract consid-
erations. From this perspective, the question raised by Thomas' refer-
ence to his sister is not-Why did he hold her up to public scom?-
but rather-Why do the facts of her particular case seem to count for 
so little when they are set against his own theory-driven assessment of 
the welfare system? 
Thomas' views on welfare stem from his generally conservative 
philosophy. Thomas grew up in the South during the waning years of 
the Jim Crow era. In this context, he observed that government was 
no friend to Black interests. State government often demeaned Black 
people; it shunned their participation; it limited them to segregated, 
unequal, and inadequate state services; and it seemed to condone 
racist violence against them. Thomas' conservatism is based upon a 
simple conclusion drawn from this experience:46 Do not, under any 
circumstances, trust government to improve the situation of Black 
people. For Thomas, it was clear that the hard work and determined 
efforts of Black people would never find their natural reward until 
racist white governments were confined to the bare essentials. And, 
in the context of this conservatism, the welfare system posed a partic-
ularly dangerous threat. Welfare may appear to fill a need. On some 
level, it may even be an act of generosity. However, when it is insti-
tuted by whites in a pervasively racist society, it can have terrible con-
sequences for Black recipients. It may breed dependency, undermine 
44. 'Ihle, the incident suggests that he is disloyal, ungenerous, and inseusitive. On the 
other hand, we should be hesitant to condemn public figures on the basis of a single incident. 
When it comes to such things as loyalty, generosity, and sensitivity, most of us have lapses-
private people, however, are simply fortunate enough to have them in private. In any case, 
Thomas himself was appalled when his account of Martin's situation was widely reported in the 
press. He apparently recognized that he had made a serious error and was prompt and sincere in 
making his apologies. See PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 24, at 145. 
45. Martin herself appears to have forgiven Thomas. She strongly supported her brother's 
nomination and remained at his side throughout the Senate hearings. 
46. While I go on to criticize Thomas for being too preoccupied with abstractious, it is 
important to note that his abstract beliefs are strongly rooted in his own experience. Perhaps a 
different way of describing Thomas' difficulty in this regard is to say that he has been so pro-
foundly affected by certain formative experiences that he is unable to understand that others 
may experience very different realities. 
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self-esteem, and reduce incentives for self-improvement and hard 
work. 
What makes Thomas' assessment of his sister's situation so troub-
ling is not that Thomas holds such conservative views-indeed these 
views are widely held in the Black community47 -but that his abstract 
views on race and welfare prevent him from seeing the undeniable 
realities of his sister's situation. Is she properly called a "welfare 
addict" when she needs her check to feed and clothe her family? 
Should Emma Mae Martin "just say no" and, if so, to whom and to 
what? 
My point is this. Suppose we assume for the moment that 
Thomas is right and that the welfare system is, on balance, bad for the 
Black community. It does not necessarily follow that all Black citizens 
should shun welfare payments even when they are desperately 
needed. Many generally bad institutions have some local benefits. 
And, while there may be circumstances where individuals should 
forgo these benefits, such sacrifice is normally justified by a showing 
that it will, in fact, bring about a long-range benefit. Should Emma 
Mae Martin have left her (and Thomas') aunt out on the street rather 
than participate in the evils of the welfare system? To justify an 
affirmative answer, most people would place a heavy burden on 
Thomas to show that there is some practical point to refusing help. 
But it never seems to occur to Thomas that there is such a burden. 
For him, practical arguments are not important-abstract theories 
offer the final word; they are the measuring sticks against which all 
human action should be evaluated. And, as a result, questions of right 
and wrong will seldom have a human dimension. For Thomas, there 
are no gray areas and no mitigating factors-one's abstract principles 
generate a series of categorical judgments that need never yield to a 
human dimension. 
2. Anita Hill: Thomas' Protege 
Anita Hill's appearance sparked renewed interest in the Senate 
hearings. Her charge of sexual harassment was particularly harmful to 
Thomas for a number of reasons. FIrst, the sexual nature of the alle-
gations resonated with a host of negative racial stereotypes. Second, 
the charge that Thomas had abused his power undercut the moral 
position that he had seemed to acquire from his remarkable triumph 
47. See infra text accompanying note 64. 
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over adversity. Third, and most importantly, the charge of sexual har-
assment went to the heart of his fitness for the Supreme Court. If 
Thomas could not refrain from blatant sexism while he was officially 
responsible for fighting against it, how could he be trusted with the 
weighty responsibilities of a Supreme Court Justice? Furthermore, 
Hill was a credible witness. She was a lawyer with a fine reputation 
and with no apparent reason to lie-her religious background as well 
as her long association with Thomas made it unlikely that her charges 
were politically motivated. Thus, her testimony had to be heard48 and 
once heard, it radically altered the nature of proceedings. Before her 
appearance in the Senate, Thomas was well on his way to confirma-
tion. After her appearance, the nomination became a matter of bitter 
controversy. 
Much has been written about Hill's testimony arid about Thomas' 
reaction to it. The conventional wisdom seems to be that the two 
positions are so contradictory that either Thomas or Hill had to be 
lying. Thus, as I continue to take Thomas at his word,49 I feel some 
need to clarify my own position concerning the underlying contro-
versy. Like so many women, I believe Anita Hill. But my belief in 
Hill does not entail a belief that Thomas told conscious lies. It is a 
commonplace of legal proceedings that witnesses perceive events dif-
ferently and that what is vividly recalled by one observer may be 
entirely forgotten by another. Furthermore, these discrepancies are 
often especially great when the events themselves are constructed by 
power and abuse. Abusive behavior is a" complex phenomenon. 
Many who abuse others have themselves been victims of abuse and, 
both as victims and perpetrators, they employ a variety of defensive 
mechanisms. Dissociation and denial can obliterate painful memories. 
And, for this reason, it does not seem irrational to believe both that 
Thomas actually did what Hill alleged and that he is telling the truth 
with respect to his own recollection of events. 
Against this background, Thomas' assertion that he had not 
watched Hill's testimony requires some discussion. At the beginning 
48. Indeed there was some controversy about this. The Judiciary Committee had planned 
to adjourn without considering the issue but, when Hill's allegations became public, there were 
loud demands that she should be called as a witness. See, e.g., Anita Hill and the Senate's Duty, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at A24; Susan Estrich, Forced to be Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at 
A25; Anna QuindIen, Listen to Us, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at A25; Finally a Proper Hearing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at A26. 
49. At the beginning of this part, I stated that I would "proceed on the basis that [Thomas'] 
testimony was generally truthful with respect to his own recollections of motives and events." 
For the reasons stated below, this promise accords with my own view of Thomas' testimony. 
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of the second round of hearings-before Hill had testified-Thomas 
took the stand to vehemently deny all charges. Although he was ada-
mant that her charges were false, he had no explanation of why she 
would make false charges against him. Thus, he complained that his 
strength had been sapped by Hill's reckless and scurrilous charges: 
It was sapped out of me because Anita Hill was a person I consid-
ered a friend, whom I admired and thought I had treated fairly and 
with the utmost respect. 
Perhaps I could have ... better weathered this if it was from 
someone else. But here was someone I truly felt I had done my best 
with.5o 
Throughout his testimony, he appeared sincerely baffled about what 
could have prompted her to make such serious charges: "Though I 
am, by no means, a perfect person-no means-I have not done what 
she has alleged. And I still don't know what I could possibly have 
done to cause her to make these allegations."51 Indeed, Thomas was 
confronted by seemingly inconsistent circumstances. On the one 
hand, Hill had been a trusted and valued employee. Thomas stated 
that he was fond of her; that he respected her integrity; and that he 
viewed her as a protege-as his special charge.52 Thus, in his view, 
there was no particular reason why she would want to do him any 
harm. On the other hand, Hill had come forward with some very seri-
ous charges and, with respect to these, Thomas believed that she had 
lied under oath and that she had, in particular, told lies that were 
especially hurtful and damaging to him. Thus, prior to Hill's testi-
mony, Thomas' own beliefs were in conflict and, according to his own 
testimony, he had been desperately searching for an explanation. In 
such circumstances, most people would find it helpful to watch Hill's 
testimony. As a lawyer, Thomas presumably recognized the power of 
live testimony to resolve factual discrepancies. Live testimony gives 
us the opportunity not only to assess the witness's credibility but also 
to draw conclusions about his or her certainty, precision, and skill at 
observation and interpretation. And we can assess these things not 
just in general but with partiCUlar regard for the matter under discus-
sion. Thus, if Thomas had difficulty reconciling his general impression 
50. Thomas: 'This Is Worse Than Any Obstacle • •• That I Have Ever Faced', WASH. POST, 
Oct. 12, 1991, at AS, AS [hereinafter Obstacle]. 
51. Ill. 
52. He stated: "This is a person I have helped at every tum in the road since we met. She 
seemed to appreciate the continued cordial relationship we had since day one. She sought my 
advice and counsel, as did virtually all the members of my personal staff. II Ill. 
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of Hill's honesty with the perceived falsity of her charges, watching 
her testimony might have helped him to resolve this difficulty. 
It is also worth noting that the nature of Hill's charges made it 
especially important for Thomas to watch the testimony. One poten-
tial explanation of Hill's charges was that they were based upon a mis-
take; that she had simply misinterpreted some of his behavior.53 In his 
initial testimony, Thomas seemed to favor this explanation and he 
even tendered a somewhat tentative apology: 
I cannot imagine anything that I said or did to Anita Hill that could 
have been mistaken for sexual harassment. But with that said, if 
there is anything that I have said that has been misconstrued by 
Anita Hill or anyone else to be sexual harassment, then I can say 
that I am so very sorry and I wish I had known. H I did know, I 
would have stopped immediately and I would not, as I've done over 
the past two weeks, had to tear away at myself trying to think of 
what I could possibly have done.54 
Certainly many people who heard this statement could sympathize 
with Thomas' plight. 1\vo great fears have accompanied the develop-
ment of sexual harassment doctrine. The first is that women will use 
false accusations to exact revenge for grievances real or imagined; the 
second is that women will misunderstand or misinterpret well-mean-
ing gestures of esteem and affection. Thomas, confronted by Hill's 
accusations, grabbed at both alternatives: The charges were false but, 
if not false, then they were the result of misunderstanding. But we 
would expect such a person, if sincere, to take the trouble to examine 
the charges against him. "What did I say or do?" he might ask. "Did I 
inadvertently overstep the bounds? Did she misunderstand? What 
does she say is the basis for her charges?" Listening to Anita Hill was 
Thomas' best opportunity to answer these questions. 
Given these circumstances, Thomas' assertion that he had not 
watched Hill's testimony took the Senate committee by surprise.55 
Surely, at the very least, listening to Hill would be an important step 
to take in his own defense. On the other hand, if my thesis about 
Thomas is correct-if, in fact, he lives in a world of abstractions and 
generalities rather than in a world of concrete details-then his lack of 
interest in Hill's testimony is readily understood by analyzing it in 
53. Hill's subsequent testimony was so graphic as to make the "mistake" explanation 
rather unlikely. 
54. Obstacle, supra note 50. 
55. I Have Been Pilloried With Scurrilous Allegations . •. I Deny Them Tonight, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 12, 1991, at A12. 
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terms of his unrelenting preference for the abstract over the concrete. 
In this particular instance, the preference is played out as a contrast 
between the general nature of his denials and the painful specificity of 
Hill's allegations. There was no reason, he seemed to suggest, why 
anyone should listen to Hill when he had already put the matter to 
rest by tendering the appropriate denials. Thus, Senator Heflin's 
prompting-
But if you didn't listen and didn't see her testify, I think you 
put yourself in an unusual position. You in effect are defending 
yourself, and basically some of us want to be fair to you, fair to her, 
but if you didn't listen to what she said today, then that puts it 
somewhat in a more difficult task to find out what the actual facts 
are relative to this matter.56 
-received this reply: 
The facts keep changing, senator. When the FBI visited me, 
the statements to this committee and the questions were one thing; 
the FBI's subsequent questions were another thing; and the state-
ments today as I received summaries of them were another thing. It 
is not my fault that the facts change. What I have said to you is 
categorical, that any allegations that I engaged in any conduct 
involving sexual activity, pornographic movies, attempted to date 
her, any allegations, I deny. It is not true. 
So the facts can change, but my denial does not.57 
Notice how this answer pitted Thomas' denial against the "facts." The 
facts are unreliable and keep changing. His denial, on the other hand, 
is categorical and unwavering. There is no need, he seems to suggest, 
for anyone to delve into the facts so long as he has made his denial. 
The suggestion that denials trump facts goes a long way towards 
explaining why Thomas felt it was appropriate to attack the Judiciary 
Committee for providing Hill with an opportunity to testify. A typical 
example of these attacks occurred in Thomas' prepared statement: 
I think that this today is a travesty. I think it is disgusting. I 
think that this hearing should never occur in America. This is a case 
in which this sleaze, this dirt was searched for by staffers of mem-
bers of this committee, was then leaked to the media, and this com-
mittee and this body validated it and displayed it at prime time over 
our entire nation. . .. And from my standpoint, as a black Ameri-
can ... it is a message that unless you kowtow to an old order, this is 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
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what will happen to you. You will be lynched, destroyed, carica-
tured by a committee of the U.S. Senate rather than hung from a 
tree.58 
139 
This attack on the Committee and Thomas' use of the lynching meta-
phor proved to be effective.59 It seemed to intimidate his opponents 
and to render them helpless to mount an offensive. But it would be a 
mistake to think that Thomas' response was solely a matter of shrewd 
and calculated politics. To the contrary, it was an instinctual response 
that was deeply rooted in his own particular mode of interaction with 
the world. 
3. Natural Law: Thomas' Commitment to Conservative Principles 
In June 1987, Thomas gave a speech to the Heritage Founda-
tion.60 In it he recounted his experiences as one of the few Black 
Americans in the Reagan Administration. The speech developed two 
major themes: first, his deep commitment to conservative principles 
and, second, his sense of exclusion from conservative circles. 
One cannot read this speech without understanding that Thomas' 
political views come straight from the heart. It does him a grave injus-
tice to suggest that his commitment to conservative causes is insincere 
and opportunistic. To the contrary, it is deeply rooted in his Georgia 
boyhood. "I grew up," Thomas tells us, "under state-enforced segre-
gation, which is as close to totalitarianism as I would like to get.,,61 
While the state was his enemy, Thomas' family provided a strong ref-
uge as well as a model for living in an openly hostile environment: 
My household ... was strong, stable, and conservative . . . . 
God was central. School, discipline, hard work, and knowing right 
from wrong were of the highest priority. Crime, welfare, slothful-
ness, and alcohol were enemies. But these were not issues to be 
debated by keen intellectuals, bellowed about by rousing orators, or 
dissected by pollsters and researchers. They were a way of life; they 
marked the path of survival and the escape route from squalor.62 
Thus, for Thomas, escape from the twin misfortunes of race and pov-
erty was a matter of individual effort. In the Jim Crow South, he 
58. Judge Thomas' Evening Statement to the Committee, WASH. POST, Oct 12, 1991, at A12. 
59. For an insightful critique of Thomas' lynching metaphor, see Kendall Thomas, Strange 
Fruit, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 364. 
60. The speech was reprinted as No Room at the Inn: The Loneliness of the Black Con-
servative. Thomas, supra note 21, at 72. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
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knew, it would have been foolish to look to the government for help. 
Equally foolish, he thought, was the idea that the end of state-spon-
sored segregation meant a new and more active role for government 
in achieving racial progress. In a deeply racist society, he believed, 
any form of government assistance is bound to be more apparent than 
real. Government solutions, he argued, are patronizing and paternal-
istic; they only impede the development of self-sufficiency. Thus, the 
basis of Thomas' conservatism is aptly summarized in this passage 
from his speech: 
Self-sufficiency and spiritual and emotional security were tools 
to carve out and secure freedom. Those who attempt to capture the 
daily counseling, oversight, common sense, and vision of my grand-
parents in a governmental program are engaging in sheer folly. 
Government cannot develop individual responsibility, but it cer-
tainly can refrain from preventing or hindering the development of 
this responsibility.63 
From this, Thomas concluded that it was in the best interests of Black 
Americans to oppose big government in all its forms. 
Obviously, as a conservative Republican, Thomas was at odds 
with much of the national Black leadership. His substantive views, 
however, had substantial support in the Black community. Thomas 
frequently pointed out that many Blacks "think right but vote left.,,64 
"Right" thinking-Republican thinking-emphasizes a number of 
themes that resonate with Black experience. For example, the Black 
community includes many religious organizations-both Muslim and 
Christian-that preach self-reliance, family values, and strong deter-
rence of criminal activity. It also includes political organizations that 
promote racial separatism and economic self-sufficiency. Ideologi-
cally, these organizations have more in common with the Republican 
emphasis on Black capitalism than they do with the liberal program of 
integration and affirmative action. Thus, within the Black community, 
Thomas' conservatism is a familiar theme as millions of African 
Americans have adopted hard work and high moral standards as their 
response to racism. 
What is unusual about Thomas is not his commitment to con-
servative principles but instead his choice of the Reagan-Bush Repub-
lican party as a forum for his political efforts. This choice is especially 
puzzling given the fact that, by his own account, he had been badly 
63. ld. 
64. See, e.g., id. at 76. 
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treated in conservative circles. The speech to the Heritage Founda-
tion is especially clear on this point. Conservatives, Thomas charged, 
do not really welcome Black participation. "[T]here was the appear-
ance," he said, "within the conservative ranks that blacks were to be 
tolerated but not necessarily welcomed. ,,65 This appearance, he 
argued, was reinforced in a number of ways. First, the Reagan admin-
istration had made "little or no effort ... to proselytize those blacks 
who were on the fence or who had not made up their minds about the 
conservative movement.,,66 Second, it had adopted a consistently neg-
ative tone when dealing with race issues.67 And third, it had made 
numerous decisions that pointlessly alienated potential Black voters.68 
But beyond these matters, its treatment of Thomas and other Black 
Republicans was particularly grievous.69 Conservatives, Thomas felt, 
had marginalized him-
I would have to characterize the general attitude of conserva-
tives toward black conservatives as indifference-with minor excep-
tions. It was made clear more than once that, since blacks did not 
vote right, they were owed nothing.1o 
-stereotyped him-
[T]here was the constant pressure and apparent expectation that 
even blacks who were in the [Reagan] administration and consid-
ered conservative publicly had to prove themselves daily .... For 
blacks the litmus test was fairly clear. You must be against affirma-
tive action and against welfare. And your opposition had to be ada-
mant and constant or you would be suspected of being a closet 
liberal.71 
-and failed to recognize his human diguity-
It often seemed that to be accepted within the conservative ranks 
and to be treated with some degree of acceptance, a black was 
65. Id. at 76. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 75. 
68. Thomas points specifically to the decision made by the Reagan administration to sup-
port tax exemption for Bob Jones University and to its equivocation over the Voting Rights Act 
Id. 
69. The Heritage Foundation speech is, for Thomas, an unusually candid discussion of his 
political difficulties. His more usual mode is to deny any problems as when, for example, he 
replied to a reporter's question about personal difficulties-"'You had a very rough life, didn't 
you?"'-with "I did not .•. 1 did indeed come from very modest circumstances but ... 1 had 
lived the American dream and ... 1 was attempting to secure this dream for all Americans .... " 
Id. at 77. 
70. Id. at 76. 
71. Id. 
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required to become a caricature of sorts, providing sideshows of 
anti-black quips and attacks.72 
I cite these examples at length because it seems important to recog-
nize that Thomas was indeed very badly treated by his colleagues in 
the Reagan administration. The conduct that Thomas describes is 
racist. It is abusive. And its existence at the highest levels of the fed-
eral government is deeply shocking?3 
Thomas' account of life in Republican circles tells us much about 
the Republican party and about the depth of racism in our society. It 
also tells us something important about Clarence Thomas. It is worth 
considering why a man with Thomas' abilities and opportunities 
would choose to work in such an openly hostile environment. Even if 
racism is a pervasive phenomenon, the reckless insensitivity that 
Thomas describes is not universal-some communities are more inte-
grated and inclusive than others. Indeed, Thomas himself recognized 
this fact as he confidently informed his Republican colleagues that the 
Democratic party would have provided a more supportive environ-
ment.74 Thus, Thomas' choice to plant his career in the salty soil of 
Republican politics seems a notable triumph of political principle over 
personal considerations.75 And this is especially true given that 
Thomas' political principles were not entirely in tune with the political 
practices of the Republican party. While he agreed with the general 
outlines of the Reagan revolution-small government, free enterprise, 
and government enforced family values-there were obvious differ-
ences with respect to specifics. Thomas was, for example, frequently 
disturbed by the Administration's handling of racial politics?6 Given 
the depth of these disagreements, even a highly principled person 
might consider that the choice of political alliances should be based 
upon more than just shared principles. A more balanced approach 
72. Id. 
73. The environment Thomas describes-an environment that prompted him to feel that 
he had to provide "anti-black quips" and "sideshows"-must have caused Thomas a great deal 
of personal misery. Surely, it must have been difficult for him to work day in and day out in such 
a hostile environment. And it must have been debilitating to have one's hard work met with 
suspicion and distrust. As a person, Thomas deserves our sympathy and our respectful attention. 
74. Thomas, supra note 21, at 76. 
75. There are many who would say that Thomas' involvement in Republican politics fur-
thered his ambitions. For the reasons already stated, I am skeptical that Thomas' career choices 
were dictated by a practical pursuit of personal advantage. Furthermore, while Thomas' path 
may look like a fast track when viewed ex post facto, his first Republican job-for Danforth as 
an Assistant Attorney General for the state of Missouri-does not, ex ante, stand out as a partic-
ularly ambitious choice for a young Yale Law graduate. 
76. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 21, at 75. 
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might seek a closer connection between theory and practice. And, if 
Thomas had employed such an approach, he might have been less sat-
isfied with abstract agreements and more demanding of respectful 
treatment. 
I argued in the preceding sections that Thomas is a man who is 
more strongly moved by abstract ideas than by his sense of personal 
connection to people and events. It is tempting to treat Thomas' 
career choice as simply one more example of this tendency. But this 
explanation may be an oversimplification. Racism presents people of 
color with some extremely difficult choices77 and many choose to con-
front some of the worst forms of racism in order to achieve their own 
particular vision of racial progress. To understand Thomas' decision, 
it is therefore necessary to consider his underlying vision and to ask: 
What is the vision that fueled Thomas' hope that his presence within 
the Republican party would bear the fruits of racial progress? And 
the answer to this question is not hard to find-Thomas envisions a 
Republican party revitalized by a commitment to racial justice and to 
the supremacy of naturallaw.78 
Thomas' belief in natural law is fundamental to his political 
beliefs. He explains his conception by quoting John Quincy Adams: 
Our political way of life is by the laws of nature and of nature's 
God, and of course presupposes the existence of God, the moral 
ruler of the universe, and a rule of right and wrong, of just and 
unjust, binding upon man, preceding all institutions of human soci-
ety and of government.79 
This conception provides him, on the one hand, with a philosophical 
theory of government and, on the other, with a rationale for his con-
servative politics. Natural law, as he Imderstands it, supports individu-
alism, freedom from government restraint, strong recognition of 
individual property rights, and the controversial right to life. Further-
more, his vision of natural law allows him to weld strong support for 
77. For an extended discussion of some of the practical aspects of these choices, see JILL 
NELSON, VOLUNTARY SLAVERY; My AUTIiEN'l1C NEGRO EXPERIENCE (1993). 
78. He argues, for example, that the Republican party should concentrate less on polls and 
more on "making conservatism more attractive to Americans in general." He states: "We must 
offer a vision, not vexation. But any vision must impart more than a warm feeling that 'every-
thing is just fine-keep thinking the same.' We must start by articulating principles of govern-
ment and standards of goodness. I suggest that we begin the search for standards and principles 
with the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence." Thomas, supra note 21, at 78. 
79. Id. 
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civil rights enforcement to the traditional conservative agenda. Natu-
ral law, he argues, recognizes the morality of the claim for racial 
justice: 
[The natural law] approach allows us to reassert the primacy of 
the individual, and establishes our inherent equality as a God-given 
right. This inherent equality is the basis for aggressive enforcement 
of civil rights laws and equal employment opportunity laws designed 
to protect individual rights. Indeed, defending the individual under 
these laws should be the hallmark of conservatism rather than its 
Achilles' heel.8o 
Thus, Thomas hoped to use the concept of natural law to inspire his 
Republican audience to make a greater commitment to civil rights. 
He also hoped to persuade them to be more sensitive and attentive to 
the needs of Black conservatives: 
Unless it is clear that conservative principles protect all individ-
uals, including blacks, there are no programs or arguments, no mat-
ter how brilliant, sensible, or logical, that will attract blacks to the 
conservative ranks. They may take the idea and run, but they will 
not stay and fraternize without a clear, principled message that they 
are welcome and well protected.81 
Thomas' appeal to natural law in this context is somewhat problem-
atic. While the natural law tradition has served as the conscience of 
American politics, it is not based upon any particular theory of sub-
stantive morality. Appeals to natural law must draw upon shared 
beliefs about moral requirements. Thus, for example, the Reverend 
Martin Luther King, Jr., could effectively use the concept of natural 
law to denounce the violent practices of the segregated South.82 But 
Thomas, in seeking to condemn the more subtle practices of contem-
porary racism, faced a much more difficult task-that of convincing a 
solidly conservative white audience to make an active commitment to 
civil rights not just out there but within the ranks of its own political 
community. 
Ultimately, Thomas' appeal to natural rights proved ineffective. 
While his speech received considerable comment, it did not prompt 
the Republican party to reexamine its attitudes about race. Indeed, 
the hope of inspiring such a reexamination seems misplaced and quix-
otic. In the abstract, phrases like "natural law" and "racial justice" 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM A BIRMINGHAM CITY JAIL (1963). 
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have a compelling tone. Translated into practical realities, however, 
the tone fades. It fades because racism entails a kind of blindness-an 
unwillingness or an inability to see the effects of one's own conduct. 
Racist practices often stem from routine and thoughtless acts. Thus, 
without conscious intention, white people may engage in positive or 
negative stereotyping. In addition, they may regard people of color 
with unwarranted snspicion. Further, groups that are dominated by 
white people will often fail to recognize the differing problems and 
perspectives of their Black members and, as a result, there may be 
unacknowledged burdens and double standards. For these reasons, a 
commitment to justice requires real attention and sensitivity; it does 
not just flow from the compelling tones of high-sounding phrases. 
And, as Thomas' own experience so amply demonstrated, it was pre-
cisely this kind of sensitivity that Thomas' political colleagues lacked. 
Racial justice was not (and probably would never be) their particular 
cause. And Thomas' failure to perceive this fact-a failure made all 
the more extreme by his personal experiences-casts real doubt upon 
the quality of his judgment. 
c. WHAT KIND OF JUSTICE WILL THOMAS BE? 
Over a year has passed since Thomas was sworn in as an Associ-
ate Justice of the Supreme Court. During that time his voting record 
has been consistently conservative. In most cases, he joins Justice 
Relmquist and Justice Scalia in articulating the Court's most conserva-
tive position. And indeed, for all his preconfirmation coyness, he has 
been a solid and unwavering vote against abortion rights in any 
form.83 For anyone who had read his record prior to appointment, 
these outcomes are not surprising-Thomas truly believes in con-
servative theories of law and government and, for him, these theories 
are sufficient to determine the outcome of every legal issue. 
Thomas' brief record on the Court seems to underscore the 
notion that judging is a political act. His decisions reflect his politics, 
and this leads conservatives to celebrate his steadfast commitment to 
a correct judicial philosophy and liberals to decry his mindless invoca-
tion of Republican ideology. But it is important to consider whether 
we shouldn't expect more from a Supreme Court appointment. Is this 
83. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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really the best we can do? Can we hope for nothing better than nomi-
nees who will consistently vote their politics? In this Essay, I am sug-
gesting that we should, in fact, demand a great deal more. Supreme 
Court Justices must bring to their high office more than just a political 
ideology. They should bring a certain openness and willingness to be 
moved by the plight of individual litigants. Good jUdging requires 
more than an abstract answer for every legal question; it requires an 
ability to look beyond the technical legal arguments to discern real 
injustice wherever it occurs. A good judge is able to seek justice by 
getting to the moral heart of the matter.84 Thomas, however, lacks 
these abilities.8S What is wrong with Thomas is not his conservative 
philosophy. It is his inability to open his heart,86 to listen to evi-
dence,87 and to formulate realistic strategies for bringing about pro-
gressive change.88 Unfortunately, Clarence Thomas is not the sort of 
person who is likely to inspire genuine respect for the breadth of his 
heart and the depth of his soul. 
III. CLARENCE THOMAS: THE INVISmLE MAN 
I want to close this essay by explaining why I see (or don't see) 
Thomas as "The Invisible Man." At one point during the hearings, 
Thomas said that he had "stripped down like a runner" in anticipation 
of his appointment to the COurt.89 By this he meant that he had 
renounced his general political beliefs so that he could fairly decide 
controversial cases. What came to my mind at this moment was an 
. 84. One feminist has argued that feminist jurisprudence must attempt to identify the 
"moral crux of the matter." Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 
95 YALE LJ. 1373, 1389 (1986). I agree with Scales but believe that this task is an essential 
element of the judicial function whether one is a feminist or not. 
85. Indeed, Thomas' opinions often display a technical style that makes the practical issue 
presented by the case difficult to see. See, e.g., U.S. v. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351 (1992) (holding 
that it was error for the lower court to credit a criminal defendant with time spent in official 
detention); Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
prisoner who had been beaten by prison guards did not have a claim under the Eighth Amend-
ment). But see Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S: Ct. 1093 (1992) (holding that defendant's member-
ship in a racist prison gang was irrelevant to any issue being decided in the punishment phase), 
where Thomas' dissenting opinion puts the practical elements of the case into a clearer 
perspective. 
86. This inability is illustrated by Thomas' harsh appraisal of his sister. See supra part 
II.B.1. 
87. This inability is illustrated by Thomas' refusal to listen to Anita Hill. See supra part 
II.B.2. 
88. This inability is illustrated by Thomas' quixotic hope of reforming the Republican party 
by appeals to natural law. See supra part II.B.3. 
89. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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image of Claude Rains in "The Invisible Man."~ In one scene, he 
appeared as a normal person wearing a coat, hat, and muffler. When 
he removed these items, however, there was nothing underneath. The 
coat, the hat, and the muffler were the man. Without the clothing, 
there was no physical body to mark his presence. Thus, as Thomas 
removed the coat and hat of political principles, he seemed to render 
himself invisible. Who, we might ask, is Clarence Thomas if he is not 
understood in terms of his commitment to conservative politics? And 
to this question, the answer seems reasonably clear-Clarence 
Thomas is his principles; he lacks the flesh and blood of concrete con-
nection to individual context. 
I began Part II with a commitment to discuss Thomas' qualifica-
tions independently of race. This commitment seemed desirable for a 
white writer who was about to evaluate a Black nominee.91 It is also 
true that race and gender have dominated most of the discussions 
about Thomas and I felt that there was much to learn from a "race 
neutral" approach. On the other hand, I began with some misgivings 
about whether it was possible to exclude race from an examination of 
Thomas' qualifications.92 In this society, race matters; it especially 
matters in Thomas' world of high-powered politics. In writing this 
Essay, I was reminded over and over again of the many ways in which 
race had an impact on Thomas and on people's perceptions of 
Thomas.93 What I see in Thomas is a man who has suffered many 
forms of racial abuse and who has tried to avoid the pain of this abuse 
by "living in his head." While this perception of Thomas provokes 
real sadness and sympathy, it also leads me to believe that he is a poor 
choice for the Supreme Court ... but I have doubts about my ability 
to make a race-neutral assessment of this issue. 
These doubts are well illustrated by another image of an invisible 
man. In 1947 Ralph Ellison wrote a novel entitled The Invisible 
Man.94 The protagonist of this novel is an "invisible man" of flesh and 
90. The Invisible Man (Universal Productions 1933). 
91. While it is true that we often ignore race in evaluating the qualifications of white peo-
ple, we may not be justified in this practice. If white people benefit from the privileges accorded 
on account of race in a racist society, why should we not take that fact into account in assessing 
their qualifications? 
92. See supra note 34. 
93. Fortuuately, there are two excellent collections of essays that deal with the racial 
aspects of the Thomas nomination: CoURT OF ApPEAL, supra note 19, and RACE-ING JUSTICE, 
supra note 16. See also Symposium, Gender, Race and the Politics of Supreme Court Appoint-
ments: The Import of the Anita HilUClarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1992). 
94. RALPH ELUSON, THE lNvIsmLE MAN (1947). 
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blood-he is embodied but unseen. He wanders the streets but 
remains invisible to the dominant white society. He lives unnoticed in 
their city and feels disconnected and disregarded. This too is Clarence 
Thomas. Whether it was his classmates who called him "America's 
Blackest Chlld,,95 or the comfortable white liberals who suggested that 
he was an "Oreo cookie," Thomas has been cruelly misperceived in a 
variety of undeniably racist ways.96 Ellison's story reminds us to ask 
an important question: Is Thomas invisible or merely hidden? Does 
Thomas lack the flesh and blood of concrete connection, or is he con-
nected to a context that we, as members of a predominantly white 
society, find it difficult to see? 
95. PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 24, at 41. 
96. He has also been painfully invisible to those around him. For example, when the Rev-
erend Martin Luther King, Jr. was shot, Thomas was attending a Catholic seminary. A fellow 
seminarian, unaware of Thomas' presence said "That's good, I hope the SOB dies." Id. at 44. 
See also supra text accompanying notes 66-73. 
